
The Development of Cross-Straits Relations

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Foreword

As a consequence of an unresolved historical conflict, the body of waters between Taiwan and Mainland China had, before the '70's, become an unbridgeable political chasm that divided the two sides. Even though efforts in recent years have brought about favorable interactions in many areas, a number of issues remain thorny and difficult, creating mistrust and misunderstanding. Differences over these issues have not only created mutual distrust and misunderstanding, they have also cast a shadow over the future of cross-strait relations.

In what ways have cross-strait relations evolved? What is the status quo? What are the crucial issues that stall progress? How do the two governments concerned view each other? And how do they respond to actions taken by the other? These are the focal issues we must address. We will explore into these issues and, furthermore, ponder over how the relationship should develop.

I. Developments in cross-Straits relations

A. Divided governance: history and reality

The Nationalist-Communist Civil War has resulted in the existence of two separate and mutually non-subordinate governments on Mainland China and Taiwan. Divided governance has persisted to this day, and no solution is yet in sight. The development of cross-Straits relations can be roughly divided into three stages:

(1) Military confrontations (1949-1978)

During this period the two sides stood in tense confrontation. Our government held the conviction that "The Hans and their enemies do not co-exist" and endeavored to recover the lost Mainland. On the other hand, the PRC aimed to "liberate Taiwan through the use of force." Major battles such as the Gunningtou Battle (1949) and the August 23rd Artillery Battle (1958) took place during this period. It was not until the 1960's did one see any significant sign of reduced military hostilities between the two sides. Complete cessation of military confrontation came only after the PRC and the United States established diplomatic ties in 1979.

(2) Peaceful face-off (1978-1987)

Due to changes on the international scenes, cross-Straits relations moved away from military confrontations to peaceful face-off. After the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1979, the PRC advocated, in its "Letter to the Taiwan Compatriots," an agenda of "peaceful reunification" and proposed that the two sides establish "Three Direct Links" in commerce, postal services and transportation. A few years later, Deng Xiaoping brought forth in 1984 the policy of "one nation, two systems," intending it to serve as the basis for resolving the cross-Straits question. Our government responded with "Reunification under the Three Principles of the People" and adopted the policy of the "Three No's," namely, "no contact, no negotiation, and no compromise," as a counter measure against the PRC's reunification offensive.

(3) Civilian exchanges (1987 up to the present)

In 1987 the government lifted the martial law and allowed citizens to visit relatives on the Mainland, thus opening up a new era in cross-Straits relations. After the '90s, the two sides further set into action multilevel interactions and exchanges, and continued to move toward establishing a deeper relationship of cooperation. Although political issues are still as difficult as ever to resolve, the two shores have continued to carry out frequent exchanges in areas such as trade and commerce, social activities, culture and education, academic cooperation and entertainment and recreation.

B. Key problems in present cross-Straits relations

After 50 long years of separation and divided governance, significant political, economic, social and cultural differences have developed between the two sides. In terms of land mass, population, natural resources and military strength, the two sides are obviously two mismatched political entities. With marked differences in lifestyle and huge imbalance of power, it is inevitable that, in the process of exchange and interaction, discrepancies of perceptions will develop and controversies will arise. Differences in regard to the issue of sovereignty are especially poignant.

(1) Differences over "One China"

The greatest controversy revolves around the issue of "one China." Basically, the PRC regards "one China" as a description of the status quo, and takes the principle of "one China" as the prerequisite for any contact and negotiation of the two sides. They are unequivocally opposed to "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan," as well as views such as "divided state" or "two equal political entities." The PRC emphasizes that "anything can be discussed under the principle of one China," hoping to push Taiwan into the "one China" framework the moment it agrees to negotiate. Our government, on the contrary, insists that at the present stage Taiwan is a sovereign state called the Republic of China, its future to be decided only by the people of Taiwan. This clearly contradicts the PRC position that "Taiwan is a part of China, and the People's Republic of China is the only China." Obviously, the greatest dilemma that bedevils cross-straits relations at present is the discrepancy in the perception of the principle of "one China."

(2) Different goals for interaction

As an extension of the controversies discussed above, the two shores also differ in their demands for the mode of interaction. Whereas Taiwan seeks to alleviate the tense political relations and increase Taiwan's economic interests through bilateral economic and trade interactions, the PRC hopes to use the same channel to force Taiwan back to the "one China" framework. For this reason, our government is concerned about the disadvantages Taiwan may suffer from unchecked bilateral trade and economic exchanges. Thus our government, while encouraging bilateral trade relations, seeks at the same time to dampen relocation of Taiwanese industry to mainland China, and vigorously promotes investment in other countries.

(3) Differences in the characterization of cross-Straits relations

Finally, the two sides characterize the nature of cross-Straits relations in radically different light. Taiwan has indefatigably emphasized democratization in an effort to merge into the international mainstream, hoping to obtain recognition and support of the international community, thereby by turning the cross-Straits question into an international issue so as to fend off Chinese hostility. The PRC, on the other hand, sees the cross-Straits question as a "domestic issue" under the "one China" framework. The PRC therefore tries its best to block and contain Taiwan's international space, turning cross-Straits diplomatic contest into a zero sum game.

II. Mainland's Taiwan Policy

A. Guiding principles of China's cross-Straits policy

From its founding in 1949 to the establishment of formal diplomatic ties with the United States in 1979, the PRC consistently regarded cross-Straits relations from the perspective of "dynastic change." It insisted that it had inherited the sovereignty of the Republic of China, and saw the Republic of China on Taiwan as a renegade regime that refused to come under its rule.

(1) One China principle

As a result, China's position remains unchanged throughout the vicissitudes of history: from the early "liberation by force" to the present "peaceful reunification," China, though adjusting its form of approach, has never, in spirit, swerved from the principle of "one China." In other words, though with the change of time and environment China may have rephrased its justification, yet under the banners of "national sovereignty" and "national reunification," it remains adamant on the principle of "one China."

(2) Non-equal political entities

Governed by the principles broached above, the PRC does not allow Taiwan to develop substantial political ties with other countries, and takes strong measures to suppress Taiwan's diplomatic space. The PRC, however, realizes that it is unable to completely block off Taiwan's international space. Thus while the PRC insists that the international community can only treat Taiwan as a non-equal political entity and *not* as an independent political entity, it does allow Taiwan to move in the ambiguous space where economic issues are addressed among sovereign states. The fact that both PRC and Taiwan joined WTO simultaneously is one prominent example which indicates that Taiwan is allowed to participate in international activities by using names which vaguely suggest that it is not "China's Taiwan," thereby carrying implications of sovereignty.

In short, any event which involves national sovereignty and carries a political implication which impinges on the principle of "One China" is bound to incur the ire of the PRC and provoke it to exert its utmost to suppress Taiwan's international space. The PRC holds the position that it has inherited China's sovereignty, that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and therefore does not enjoy any sovereignty. From this position the PRC has never retreated.

B. "One Country Two Systems" and other Taiwan policies

Governed by the principles broached above, the PRC has never given up the possibility of liberating Taiwan by force, even though no military conflict has occurred since 1979. Upholding the premise of "not giving up the option of liberating Taiwan by force," the PRC has nevertheless adopted a flexible approach and proposed to Taiwan a variety of ways to solve the issue divided governance. In the paragraphs below, we shall examine the issue from the PRC's perspective.

(1) "Letter to Taiwan Compatriots" and "Ye Jianying's Nine-point Proposal"

"Letter to Taiwan Compatriots," announced at the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 1979, is generally taken to have marked the beginning of PRC's adjustments of its attitude and policy toward Taiwan. The Letter recognizes that Taiwan is an economic entity, and seems to carry a vague and indirect implication that Taiwan is a political entity. Moreover, the 1981 "Ye Jianying's Nine-point Proposal" officially positions Taiwan as a special administrative region. This is as good as saying that the civil war between the two shores has ended, the change of regimes completed, the PRC has inherited China's sovereignty and Taiwan is but a local special administrative region under its rule.

(2) The Proposal of “one Country, two systems”

The basic principle of “one nation, two systems” is that “there are two different political systems within the same country.” The concept of “special administrative region” as broached in “Ye Jianying’s Nine-point Proposal ” becomes the foundation of the PRC’s “one nation, two systems” position, and in the 1994 “Sino-British Joint Declaration” this is precisely the model according which the Hong Kong question was dealt with. The PRC further declared, immediately following this, that it would solve the Taiwan issue in accordance with the model of “one nation, two systems.” Since 1990, especially in its 1993 white book *The Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China*, the PRC has directly treated the Taiwan Question as if the two shores had already been in the state of “one nation, two systems.” In such a situation, the PRC would of course continue to oppose Taiwan contending with it for legitimacy, or taking such position as the divided state or two equal political entities to wrestle with it. Proceeding from such a position, the PRC is opposed to Taiwan maintaining any external governmental relations while allowing non-governmental ones. What we have discussed earlier, that Taiwan may join the international community without highlighting its sovereign status, is a case in point. Nevertheless, the PRC understands that it cannot force Taiwan into this constricted framework with complete success.

(3) Jiang Zemin’s eight-point formula

In 1995, Jiang Zemin came up with an eight-point proposal on the Taiwan question, commonly referred to as “Jiang Zemin’s eight-point formula.” Some interpret it as expressing a certain degree of goodwill, but others see in it an attempt to pacify Taiwan. In any case, Jiang Zemin’s “eight-point formula” does catch one’s attention: it not only abstains from any mention of “one nation, two systems,” but also goes on to emphasize that both sides can use shared Chinese culture as a platform for a cultural rather than economic integration. Besides, it also proposes that leaders of both shores undertake reciprocal visits, and that the state of belligerency be brought to an end through negotiations under the principle of “one China.” Jiang’s eight point proposal has subsequently become the pivot in the PRC’s dealings with Taiwan.

(4) Hu Jintao’s four-point proposal and the anti-secession law

In March 2005, PRC president Hu Jintao enunciated a four-point platform on cross-Straits relations. The four points include: never waver in adhering to the one-China principle, never give up efforts to seek peaceful reunification, never deviate from the guiding principle of placing hope on the people of Taiwan, and never compromise in opposing Taiwanese secessionist activities. This is generally regarded as Hu’s propagandist carrot-and-stick approach and a declaration of sovereignty over Taiwan, but once again it also opens China’s hard-line position to questioning and criticism. Besides, passage of the Anti-Secession Law on March 14 leads many to think that cross-Straits relations have reached a new turning point.

III. Taiwan’s Mainland policy

A. Principles guiding Taiwan’s handling of cross-Strait relations

(1) The principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity

After the lifting of martial law, although our cross-Strait policy has undergone changes in the different historical-political milieu, the guiding principles remain the same. The supreme principles which guide our handling of cross-Strait relations have always been “reason, peace, parity and reciprocity.” Reason defines the basic thinking in our government’s handling of cross-Strait affairs; peace is the fundamental principle;

parity means that people on Taiwan and on the Mainland should be treated with equal respect; and reciprocity aims to achieve a win-win situation by taking care of both sides' interest in cross-Strait exchange. On the basis of the these four principles, our government holds respecting the free choice of the 23 million people on Taiwan and insuring their future well-being as highest guidelines in handing cross-Strait matters.

(2) The three no's

During the period of military confrontation, our government's mainland policy, proceeding from the preoccupation with "contending for political legitimacy" with the PRC, can be summed up as "opposing Communism and recovering the Mainland," with "No coexistence with the enemy of Han" as a complementary principle. During the time of peaceful face-off, in order to contend with the PRC's united front offensive, our government adopted the "Three No's" policy as a guiding principle in dealing with cross-Strait affairs.

(3) Two equal political entities

In 1987 our government allowed its citizens to visit their relatives on the Chinese mainland, thus officially ushered in an era of legal civilian contacts and exchanges between the two shores, and changes in cross-Strait relations began to develop. On top of this, the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988, when the cold war era coming to an end, brought about a reshuffle in Taiwan's political power structure, and the government's Mainland policy switched from the "Three No's" mentioned above to that of "two equal political entities," which may also be regarded as the "quasi-divided nation model." With the adoption of the so-called "pragmatic foreign policy" as the new mode of thinking in diplomatic affairs and Mainland policies, the government began, in the 90's, to lay down a new foundation for the handling of cross-Strait relations. In this context, a batch of new organizations were created: The National Reunification Council, The Mainland Affairs Council of The Executive Yuan, and The Straits Exchange Foundation. These organizations were to play an important role in the institution and implementation of cross-Strait policies.

(4) Guidelines for national reunification

In 1991, "The Guidelines for National Reunification" was promulgated and "The Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion" was terminated. This means that the government has declared, *de jure*, the end of the Nationalist-Communist Civil War and no longer views the PRC as a rebel group. In 1993, "Statutes Governing the Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area," which regulates the dealings between people of the two sides, was enacted. The actions taken by the government signals that cross-Strait relations are headed in a promising direction. This also indicates that the government is determined to dispel the shadows of the Civil War and reestablish a normalized and regulated cross-Strait relationship that conforms to the need of the times. From our perspective, cross-Strait relations have gradually entered the stage of normal development since the '90s.

Even though there have been moments of tension in the decade since the beginning of cross-Strait exchange, and even though with the first party alternation in power in 2000 some policy adjustments have been made, the principles of reason, peace, parity, and reciprocity remain the core values that tie the policies together.

B. Guidelines for national reunification and other Mainland policies

Enacted in 1991, the "Guidelines for National Unification" can be seen as the highest guiding principle of our country's Mainland policy in the 90's. It is also an expression of our goodwill toward and high expectation of Mainland China. Important principles of the "Guidelines" are as follows:

(1) Establishing a democratic, free and equitably prosperous China

The goal of “The Guidelines” is to establish a “democratic, free, and equitably prosperous China.” It holds fast to the position of “one China” and emphasizes that divided governance of the two sides is a temporary and transitional phenomenon, and that China will inevitably move forward toward reunification. It emphatically stresses the undeniable fact of the Republic of China’s existence. It seeks to safeguard Taiwan’s security and well-being, and to open up dialogue and negotiation with the other side in accordance with the principles of reason, peace, parity and reciprocity. The Guidelines also draws up a time frame for reunification to take place in three phases:

Chart 7-1 The three phases for unification in the National Reunification Guidelines

Short Term	exchanges and reciprocity	Neither side denies the other’s existence as a political entity, and neither side disrupts the other’s activities in the international community
Middle Term	mutual trust and cooperation	Creating official communication channels, promoting mutual visits by high-ranking officials, and realizing the three direct links
Long Term	consultation for reunification	Setting up consultation mechanisms to handle the task of reunification in accordance with the will of the people

The drawing up and implementation of the Guidelines represented our government’s policy in the early phase of cross-Strait contacts; it continued to cast cross-Strait relations in the light of the Nationalist-Communist civil war and still entertained the possibility of eventual reunification. However, changes in domestic politics have so radicalized our relationship with the PRC that it has become ever clearer that we are moving toward positioning the two sides as two separate and independent political entities. Thus on February 27, 2006 our government declared that the Guidelines were no longer applicable. Nevertheless, things such as establishing communication channels and fulfilling the three direct links remain important principles in our current cross-Strait policy.

(2) Two equal political entities

In contrast to the Guidelines, at the present stage, our country’s Mainland policy moves toward the position that Taiwan is an independent sovereign state. In October 1998, for example, when Mr. Gu Zhenfu led a delegation to Shanghai and Beijing, our government explicitly cast the visit in the light of “two equal political entities,” a position which guided the the delegation’s discussions and interactions with the PRC. The position was reiterated in President Li Tenghui’s July 1999 proposition that the two political entities across the Taiwan Strait constitute a “special state to state relationship.” After the change of administration in 2000, President Chen Shuibian’s pronouncements on cross-Strait relations or Mainland policy also revolved around this axis.

IV. Cross-Strait interactions and their prospect

A. Respective political, social, and economic transformations on each side of the Taiwan Strait

(1) Taiwan

Since its retreat to Taiwan in 1949, our government has moved forward in great strides toward building Taiwan into a modern nation. After decades of hard work, the goal has finally been achieved: Taiwan is now a prosperous treasure island.

(a) The realization of democracy

Politically, our country has steadily moved towards democratization. After the conclusion of the Period of Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion in 1991, our country launched forth a series of constitutional reforms, including the broadening of people's rights to political participation and the full-scale re-election of members of the legislature. The institution of direct presidential election in 1996 is a special signal of the achievement of Taiwan's democratic transformation. And the party alternation in power that took place in 2000 is a still more significant milestone, which marks the consolidation of our country's democratization.

(b) An economic miracle

Economically, the government has, since the '50's, launched a series of reforms in an effort to rejuvenate rural economy, and thus lay down a solid foundation for Taiwan's economic revival. In addition, subsequent economic planning and efficient use U.S. aids led to Taiwan's rapid economic development, culminating in the creation of the much-envied "economic miracle" in the '80's. Thus in thirty short years, Taiwan moved from an underdeveloped economy to a developing economy, and is forging in great strides toward the status of a developed country.

(c) A pluralistic society

Political and economic achievements energized Taiwan and all sorts of social groups and activities emerge with unusual vigor and vitality. Ideas of freedom and democracy are deeply rooted in the society; people on Taiwan are not only encouraged to speak out their minds and express their opinions, but to turn them into reality. A myriad voices and activities are heard and seen in every corner of the society, forming into a grand symphony that further invigorates Taiwan, filling it with life and vitality, fully revealing it to be a free, democratic and pluralistic society.

(2) Mainland China

(a) The making of a world factory

Mainland China, on the other hand, has suffered from the disasters of "The Three Red Flags" and "The Great Cultural Revolution" after the founding of the PRC, and lagged behind Taiwan politically and economically in the comparable period. It was not until 1978 when Deng Xiaoping adopted the policy of "Reform and Opening-up" did Mainland China's economy begin to show sign of life. As the reform kicked off, Mainland China sought actively to merge into the system of operation of the world capital, aiming, as the primary goal at the heart of its national policy, for a general improvement of its economy. On the one hand, it endeavored to build a strong economy by first developing pilot "spots" and the coastal provinces, hoping that the effects of reform would spread to other regions. On the other, it stepped up economic and commercial cooperation with the world community, offering outstanding investment terms to attract foreign capital. This not only made possible Mainland China's rapid economic growth, but also greatly facilitated the continuing inflow of foreign capital and skills, turning Mainland China into a "world factory."

(b) The continuation of authoritarianism

Although the PRC has achieved phenomenal success economically, politically it continues to tread down the path of authoritarianism, and its people enjoy rather limited freedom.

(c) The corruption of social institutions

In the absence of complementary measures, the negative aspects of lopsided economic development have begun to surface. As the single-minded pursuit of economic growth failed to foster a spirit of respect for the rules and regulations of the system, many high-ranking officials were often able to feather their own nests in the process

of government-industry interactions, resulting in wide spread corruption. Besides, overemphasizing development of the industrial sector to the neglect of agricultural construction has given rise to such problems as “the three agricultures.” All these are urgent issues that demand to be addressed.

B. The factor of international politics

Taiwan and Mainland China are both members of the interactive global system. Hence, any development in their relationship will affect not only themselves, but also the world community. By the same token, changes on the international scene are bound also to affect cross-Strait relations.

(1) Attitude and role of the United States

In the international society today, the United States is undoubtedly the one nation that wields the greatest influence on cross-Straits relations. Both sides covet the support of the United States so that it may have a stronger hand in dealing with the other side. Similarly, US intervention in cross-Strait politics also proceeds from consideration self-interest. Thus while during the Cold War period, the US regarded Taiwan as an important strategic bastion in its struggle against communism and Russia, later it chose, also out of strategic consideration, to cut off diplomatic ties with Taiwan in order to normalize relations with the PRC. After the disintegration of the USSR, the US views the PRC as greatest threat to its hegemonic status, and their relationship becomes rather subtle. For the US, a stable cross-Strait relation is in its best interest, because once any disturbances arise between the two sides, the US will inevitably be drawn into the conflict and its national interests jeopardized. The US certainly does not want to relive the nightmare of another Vietnam War. Moreover, the US is deeply wary of China’s “peaceful rise” and wants to avoid an open confrontation with China. Thus the US chooses to play the role of peace-keeper in the Taiwan Strait, trying to prevent either side from taking any provocative or aggressive act. Indeed, any exploration into the issue of cross-Strait relations is bound to go amiss if it fails to take into consideration the role of the US.

(2) The concern of neighboring countries

Seen from the perspective of regional politics, since both sides are located within East Asia, any cross-Strait confrontation or collaboration is bound to have an impact on the security and development of the entire region. Any warfare between the two sides will inevitably affect the future of all East Asian countries. For this reason, developments in cross-Strait relations are a matter of great concern to the neighboring countries. For example, when the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was renewed in 1996, it was expanded to include the Taiwan Strait as an area of their security concern. Though this drew strong protest from the PRC, it nevertheless demonstrates that developments in cross-Strait relations will affect the international community in a way that cannot be ignored.

C. The present situation of cross-Strait exchanges and their future prospect

In October 1987, the PRC drew up six regulations to govern Taiwan compatriots’ entry into and exit from Mainland China. In November of the same year, our government opened up Mainland-bound family visits. These can be seen as a new milestone in cross-Strait exchanges and economic-trade interactions. In the ‘90s, cross-Strait relations achieved a significant degree of breakthrough. In 1991 our government founded The Straits Exchange Foundation, and in the following year the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits was created by the PRC. In 1994 these two organizations sponsored the “Gu-Wang meeting” in Singapore. The meeting, conducted through a non-official mechanism, was the first cross-Strait political contact and negotiation, and it brought about a period of amicable interactions in cross-Strait relationship.

However, after the mid-'90s differences and disagreements over a number of issues have eroded mutual trust and blocked effective communication. For example, the PRC's military maneuvers in the Strait in 1996 led to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, which poignantly reminded Taiwan of China's military threat. In 2000, after party alternation took place in Taiwan, the PRC has repeatedly engineered our allies' termination of diplomatic relations with us. In the "Anti-Secession Law" of 2005, the PRC reiterated the position that it would not give up the option of liberating Taiwan by force. Added to this the longtime disagreement over the issue of sovereignty, and you have a very real element of uncertainty and instability in cross-Strait relations.

Although factors of instability have brought political contact and exchange to a standstill, on the non-official level, especially in trade and business, which have grown to be mutually interdependent for people across the Strait, exchanges and cooperation have spread like brush fires. Because of this, cross-Strait relations take on the character of "politically cold, economically hot." Our government, seeing that cross-Strait trade and economic development needs to be promoted, has endeavored to adopt a number of effective measures. For example, regulations which govern the economic activities of Taiwanese businessmen on Mainland China have changed with the shift of policy from "go slow, be patient" to "positive management and effective liberalization," thus further strengthening economic and commercial ties across the Strait.

In regard to the "Three Direct Links," there has been substantial progress after the party alternation. On January 1st, 2001, our government further made the ports of Jinmen-Xiamen and Mazu-Fuzhou as sites of the "Mini Three Direct Links." This not only enhanced economic and commercial exchanges of the two sides, but could also be seen as a harbinger of the "Three Direct Links" proper. The "New Year Charter Flight," initiated in 2003, can be seen as the forerunner of direct transportation, boding well for its future development. Besides, the first cargo charter flight took place in July 2006 and opened up another opportunity for the Three Direct Links. All these show that trade and economic activities between the two sides continue to move in a positive direction.

Beside trade and economy, other types of exchanges across the Strait have also been going on and progressing steadily. It is commonplace for people from Taiwan to visit the Chinese mainland as tourists. Academics, educators as well as people from the cultural circles from both sides have frequently organized conferences and invited members from each side to participate. The film and TV industry from both sides have also worked together to produce works that are widely circulated across the Strait. One must mention in particular that, in recent years, Taiwanese drama has enjoyed a phenomenal success among Mainland audiences. Even religious groups from Taiwan have caught on and organized massive pilgrimage to China. All these signal that the lives of the people from both sides of the Strait have already been closely knitted together, forming a symbiotic, co-prosperity sphere.

Today, there still exist significant uncertainties in cross-Strait relations. Although cross-Strait relations once fell to a freezing point after the passage of the Anti-Secession Law in 2005, but what with the timely visits to Mainland China by KMT chairman Lian Zhan and PFP chairman James Soong, their meetings with PRC president Hu Jintao, Mainland China's good will as conveyed through the promise to send Taiwan a pair of pandas as gift, and tariff exemption for imported fruits from Taiwan, a wide space in the future prospect of cross-Strait relationship is opened for one's imagination. It is hoped that people from both sides of the Strait would apply greater wisdom and work closely together to break the deadlock that has troubled the two sides for so long. Abiding by the principle of parity, respect, and reciprocity, let's move, through more interactions and exchanges, toward a bright and happy future for people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Footnotes:

1. Ma Ying-jeou, “Liangan guanxi de huigu yu qianzhan” (Cross-Strait Relations: Review and Prospect), in Huang Tianzhong and Zhang Wuyue, eds., *Liangan guanxi yu dalu zhengche* (Cross-Strait Relations and Mainland Policy) (Taipei: Wunan, 1993), 25-7.
2. Ling Yingming and Zhang Yazhong, *Zhongguo dalu yu liangan guanxi* (Mainland China and Cross-Strait Relations) (Taipei: Shengzhi, 2000), 234-40.
3. Li Yingming, *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (A study of mainland China) (Taipei: Wunan, 1995), 187-209.
4. Huang Kuhui, “Guolong gangling yu liangan guanxi” (Guidelines for National Reunification and Cross-Strait Relations), in Huang Tianzhong and Zhang Wuyue, *op. cit.*, 1-24.
5. See Lin Zujia, *Liangan jingmao yu zhonggong jinhji* (Cross-strait trade and economy and the economy of the PRC) (Taipei: Tianxia Wenhua, 2005).