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Evgen Bevzyuk

Doctor of History, Associate Professor
Uzhhorod National University
3, Narodna Square, Uzhhorod, 88000, Ukraine
E-mail: evbevzyuk@gmail.com
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0191-7905>

Olena Tabanyukhova

Senior Lecturer
Uzhhorod National University
3, Narodna Square, Uzhhorod, 88000, Ukraine
E-mail: intercoopdpt@gmail.com
ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5888-9621>

THE SUPRANATIONAL IDEA OF THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL EUROPE (First Half of the 19th Century)

National movement and further development of national benchmarks of the European peoples at the beginning of the revolution of 1848–1849 are one of the most socio-political contextualized pages in the past of the Slavik peoples in Europe. The research is considered to be topical since the process of formation of national ideology in the 19th century, that occurred in the Slavs environment, took place in terms of distribution of the national principle and state formation in the majority of the European countries. The purpose of the research is to enlighten the course, laws and specifics of formation of the national paradigm at the beginning of the revolution of 1848–1849. The object of the study is the national movement of the Slavs, the subject of scientific analysis is the national ideology developing under the influence of both internal and external factors.

To achieve the main goal of the research the author has considered it to be necessary to solve a number of the following tasks: to scientifically, logically, argumentatively and coherently lay out specifics of the process of Slavic national ideology formation and reveal its main features. It should be emphasized that by the beginning of the revolution the national patriotic mood was not limited merely by the demand of the cultural reforms, it gradually transformed into the context of new political and socio-economic ideas. At the same time, in the meaning of national paradigm of the Slavic National

Movement the idea of its moderation or passive opposition actualized drastically. In general, national paradigm was a certain mixture of political ideas, in which political freedom — democracy, social and personal guarantees — took a somewhat secondary place, the struggle for the national justice with its moral and cultural principles, became dominant.

On the eve of the 1848 revolution western Slavs were involved in the process of modernizing their national ideology. Al though this process was an all-European phenomenon on and large ethnic units were under going self-determination, the spiritual renaissance of the western Slavs had specific regional and ethnic characteristics, thus attracting the political attention of the governments of great empires — the Austrian and the Russian. For Russia, the biggest Slavonic country, the idea of the general Slavonic ethnic unity as well as the Pan-Slavistic ideology were not only of scientific character, but also served as a factor of geopolitical interest.

Keywords: *nation, national culture, ideology, empire, pangermanism, panamericanism, pan-Islamism, pan-Slavism, illirism, idea, democracy, monarchy, freedom, national ideology, region, ethnos, Russia, Europe, USA, Slavs, Austria, Czechs, Slovaks, Austro-Slavism, foreign policy, geopolitics.*

Євгеній Бевзюк

д-р. іст. наук, доц.

Ужгородський національний університет
88000, Україна, Ужгород, пл. Народна, 3

E-mail: evbevzyuk@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0191-7905>

Олена Табанюхова

ст. викладач

Ужгородський національний університет
88000, Україна, Ужгород, пл. Народна, 3

E-mail: intercoopdpt@gmail.com

ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5888-9621>

НАДНАЦІОНАЛЬНА ІДЕЯ В НАРОДІВ ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЇ ЄВРОПИ (перша половина ХІХ ст.)

Метою дослідження стала панідея, зокрема і панславізм конкретно. Майже у всіх етнічно споріднених народів, що входили до складу великих мовних і релігійних спільнот, на певному історичному етапі виникають неоднозначні за формою і змістом панідеології — панславізм, пангерманізм, панамериканізм, панісламізм і такі наднаціональні інтеграційні

ідеї, як австрославізм, ілліризм. Їхня мета полягала в обґрунтуванні не тільки цивілізаційної, етнокультурної, історичної спільності, але в тому числі і політичної. З часом панідеї ставали не тільки джерелом для формування національної ідеології, але також слугували й підставою для появи полінаціональних держав і забезпечували існування ідеології великодержавності.

Ключові слова: нація, національна культура, ідеологія, імперія, пан-германізм, панамериканізм, панісламізм, панславізм, ілліризм, ідея, демократія, монархія, свобода, національна ідеологія, регіон, етнос, Росія, Європа, США, слов'яни, Австрія, чехи, словаки, австрославізм, зовнішня політика, геополітика.

Pan-Slavism, both its content and terminology have not received a clear assessment and definition in national and foreign historiography yet. Admittedly, in Soviet historiography there was a considerable amount of research on supranational integration movements. Accordingly, Marxist Slavic studies focused on the social-class tradition, and only the concepts that corresponded to the ideology of the study were considered in the history of the development of the idea of Slavic reciprocity. The fact, that Russophilism of Czechs and Slovaks was regarded as one of the origins of Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship under proletarian internationalism, can be argued. At the same time, Slovak separatism, like Austro-Slavism, was most often criticised. Therefore, the given ideologisation algorithm in the study of Slavic history brought enough conventions to the terminological apparatus of researches.

A number of international conferences that took place in the 60's of the 20th century in Czechoslovakia can be considered as a certain breakthrough in the systematisation of the conceptual apparatus regarding the problems of Slavic unifying ideology and its role in the national movements of the peoples of the Habsburg Monarchy. In the course of the discussion, the researchers¹ came to the conclusion that the terms Slavic Reciprocity and Pan-Slavism, with their high level of politicisation acquired over time, should be used more rarely. According to the Slavists, the researchers should return to the term Slovanství, the use of which was common in the Czech Slavic studies of the 1930's². This rather capacious term included the whole genesis of ideas about the Slavic community in its content. In Marxist historiography, however, it was natural to take a positive view of the idea of Slavic reciprocity and to emphasize the reactionary nature of Pan-Slavism. This practice decisively brought terminological confusion in the content of many Slavic studies, so meaning and concepts of Slavic community and Pan-Slavism have often been used to refer to the same phenomena. These circumstances forced us to more closely consider the content and significance of the idea of Pan-Slavism in the

process of becoming a national paradigm in the West Slavs. A supranational Pan-Idea, which relies on certain nationalist or religious ideologies that declare the desire to unite representatives of close language and ethnic groups, has become the purpose of the study.

As is known, the first half of the 19th century was marked not only by the phenomenon of Slavic revival, but also by the beginning of an active process of national self-determination of the peoples of Central and Southeastern Europe, that belonged to different large communities — German, Slavic, Finno-Ugric. Therefore, according to the content of the destruction of old traditions and emergence of the new ones, ethnic elites were marked by the behaviour of ethno-political ambivalence — pursuit of a paradigm of identity and unwillingness to separate from large communities. This was reflected in the process of searching and forming a national ideology of many peoples, served as an additional aspect of the psychological and ideological legitimisation of national requirements. At the same time, the turbulent revival process of the Western Slavic peoples, their national ideas on the background of competitive interstate relations during the period of the Vienna geopolitical era received ambiguous assessment from politicians. Therefore, a number of Western national ideologues — F. Schuzelka, J. Schlosser, F. Engels were cautious about the ethnocultural aspirations of the West Slavs, and sometimes they openly expressed their critical opinions about the ethnic Slavic leaders' attempts to develop the theme of the Slavic universality. This approach had a clear explanation: the process of constructing a national concept and, accordingly, of linguistic revival-awakening of the West Slavs was based on an internal ideological potential, national-patriotic ideology and external aspect, in which antagonism between Pan-Slavic, Pan-German supranational ideas as well as the idea of Hungarian political nation's formation were far from being less important. However, the fact that the negative attitude towards Slavic supranational integration became one of the driving forces behind the emergence of other supranational ideas — Austrophilia and German Pan-Idea — should be acknowledged. Such Nutritional Antagonism was a logical phenomenon of the period of formation of national ideological doctrines, while the method of opposing their own to someone else's things with the subsequent rather predictable assessment was steadily used. A citation from the Viennese Presse is worth quoting here.

Pan-Slavism was flatly rated as a political, militant and destructive anti-Austrian ideology in the pages of this newspaper. "The Brotherhood that exists today on a Pan-Slavic basis is a conspiracy against Austria, and those, who are engaged in it, challenge whole Austria, so our expression of discontent is the only answer that the people of Austria can give to those, who criminally infringe on its existence," the author of the article stated³. Accordingly, the

Austrian government, trying to counteract the involvement of West Slavs in the ideology of Pan-Slavism, pursued a pragmatic policy of preventing "the harmless idea of literary reciprocity" from becoming a political Slavic programme, because in the context of a "common literary Slavic aspiration" the latter could eventually become not only a platform for the politicisation of national ideas of the West Slavs, but also create a favorable atmosphere for Russian ideological expansion, the Austro-Bohemian conservative L. Thun stated⁴.

Another group of the anti-Slavic movement opponents consisted of individual representatives of the Hungarian national movement, such as L. Kossuth, F. Pulszky, I. Széchenyi, Count Zaj, that promoted the idea of the Hungarian political nation. For example, in his letters to Count L. Thun, a well-known Hungarian socio-political figure F. Pulszky stated flatly and persuasively, "We cannot allow the Germans, Slavs, Wallachians to consider themselves foreign in our land, and Hungary — to be only a place of birth for them and that they would not seek solutions to their problems in Pest and Bratislava, but they would do in Vienna and Berlin, Prague and St. Petersburg"⁵. Thus, there was a situation where a number of European politicians sometimes interpreted the linguistic and ethno-cultural aspirations of the Western Slavic peoples solely as their political activity on the way to the realisation of a supranational project of a united Slavic nation.

Certainly, the Russian Empire was assigned a special place in the content of the pan-Slavic construction by the European national ideologists. The war and the victory over the Napoleonic France contributed to the image of the former for many more years. A characteristic feature of this time was the military uplift of Russia. Its army fought in the ethnic territories of the West Slavs, which were part of the Austrian, Saxon and Prussian Monarchies. In fact, from 1812 to 1815 Russia was regarded as the saviour of Europe from the tyrant, but very soon this country was considered Napoleon's heir. The fact, that in Slavic studies these hostilities received a mark of significance for the process of development of socio-political activity in the environment of the West Slavs, was understandable. The Czech nationalist activist F. Čelakovský, who cannot be called a Russophile, would write about the Russian victory in the war, "The Moscow flame enlightened not only all Russia, but all the Slavs as well"⁶. The fact, that familiarity with the Russian military and political forces gave the Slavs hope that Russia would be able to promote their national liberation, can be assumed. In general, the above judgment could be considered a long-standing tribute to the Russophile historians of the Russian victories, if not a letter of a Russian diplomat and, later, a Catholic priest, writer, ecclesiastical figure of the princely family Prince I.S. Gagarin to one of the leaders of the Slavophile movement I.S. Aksakov.

Given the fact, that in his letter I.S. Gagarin himself reproduces the Austrian general and writer Friedrich Schwarzenberg's opinion (1800–1870), citing an excerpt from the letter without any reductions is considered to be advisable. It should be added that Schwarzenberg's aristocrats and landowners have been considered a strong foothold of the Habsburg Dynasty for many centuries, so the views of representatives of this kind are particularly interesting for the study. Thus, in his letter, I.S. Gagarin conveys the circumstances and content of his conversation with F. Schwarzenberg, "I spent winter of 1833–1834 in Munich, where the famous commander Schwarzenberg's son Prince Fritz, who has recently died, had once told me: "Your government is not aware of all its capabilities. For example, I enter a peasant hut in one of our Austrian regions. A rather ugly paper painting depicting a man in a white uniform hangs on the wall. "What is this?", I ask the peasant. "This is the King of Austria," Gagarin writes to Aksakov. "And next to it there is another similar figure in green uniform. "And what is that?" "That is our Tsar". And note, Schwarzenberg added, "the tsar, whom the Austrian man calls his Tsar, as opposed to the Emperor of Austria, is the Russian Emperor"⁷.

Therefore, it can be assumed that there existed an attractive image of Russia and the Slavs' beliefs that the empire could promote their national liberation. At the same time, the attitude towards Russia, even among national ideologues, was romantic, that had its logical explanation. They knew about Russia only from books, had a rough idea of the activities of its scientific institutions and the achievements of Russian science. As an example, there should K. Havlíček Borovský's romanticism be mentioned with which he arrived in Russia in 1843, and which almost immediately dissipated from him because of "considerable apathy, backwardness, and stupidity"⁸, that prevailed in the Eastern Empire. T.G. Masaryk expressed his interpretation of the content of K. Havlíček Borovský's ideas and, accordingly, the reasons for the spread of Pan-Slavic ideology among the West Slavs. He considered the spread of this ideology not so much by Russian foreign expansion as by the willingness of the West Slavs to accept the idea, given their particular status in the Austrian Empire. Therefore, analysing the origins of the concept of Pan-Slavism T.G. Masaryk identified the following reason for the popularity of supranational Russophilism among the West Slavs: "In the small Slavic peoples", states the future President of Czechoslovakia, "their desire to find support and assistance from other Slavic tribes, and especially in more powerful political and cultural terms, was born"⁹. Overall, it should be noted, that, in our opinion, the true idea of the West Slavs about the condition of the Russian people, the features of the Russian political system were rather indistinct. But non-critical Russophilism and integrative Pan-Slavic tendencies still played a certain role in the formation of national ideologies in the Western Slavic environment. It is

worth agreeing that not least the foreign and military expansion of the Russian Empire gave rise to a broad theoretical, and, over time, historical and political discourse around the essence and content of supranational integration Pan-Slavic ideas, including Pan-Slavism. In view of the problem stated above, let us consider Pan-Slavism, taking into account the specifics of the relationship in the triangle of interests — the West Slavs, German and Hungarian national interests against the background of the evolution of the idea of Pan-Slavism in the content of Russian-Slavic relations and imperial relations.

But before determining the place of Pan-Slavism in the content of national ideologies of the West Slavs, the attempt to investigate some typology and regularity of the appearance of pan-ideas and pan-movements as fairly typical phenomena in the context of the formation and development of national ideologies in Central and Central Eastern Europe of the first half of the 19th century would be quite logical. There is every reason to assert that a sufficient number of examples, that serve to illustrate the naturalness of the existence of various supranational integration ideas, can be found in the historical past. In addition, the paradoxical tendency, inherent in the development of large and small societies, is worth mentioning. Its meaning is in the dialectics of unity and diversity of two tendencies — subregionalisation and regionalisation. Almost within all ethnically related peoples, that were members of large linguistic communities, at a certain historical stage there emerged pan-ideologies, ambiguous in the form and content — Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, Pan-Americanism, Pan-Islamism and such supranational integration ideas as Austro-Slavism and Illyrianism. Their purpose was to justify not only civilisational, ethno-cultural, historical unity, but also political integration. Over time, pan-ideas became not only a source for the formation of national ideology, but also served as a basis for the emergence of multinational states and secured the ideology of great power.

By means of the comparative method, the characteristic features of the individual pan-ideas, mentioned above, should be noted. First of all, Pan-Germanism was different because of its practice of introduction into the geopolitical European space. It focused on achieving both political and cultural national German unity within the traditional centuries-old political and historical space. The next idea of Pan-Americanism, unlike Pan-Germanism, is a pan-theory, in the context of which there is an idea of economic unity. The emergence of the theory itself should be considered a tribute to the geographical and geopolitical specificity of the American continent. In this regard, in one of his speeches T. Jefferson said: "European nations form a separate area of the globe, respectively, their location makes them part of another system ... America has its own hemisphere, and therefore it must have its own separate system"¹⁰. Accordingly, in contrast to the above-mentioned pan-ideas,

Pan-Islamism was, above all, a religious-political ideology that underpins the idea of religious unity of all Muslims. Hence the idea of the need to consolidate Muslims in a single Muslim state was formed.

Austro-Slavism, Illyrianism also belong to the supranational integration ideas. It is known that the former was a programme of reorganisation of the Austrian Empire into a federal state. According to the Austrian historian A. Moritz, the supranational idea of Austro-Slavism itself specifically envisaged the perspective of implementing the project of granting autonomy to the Czechs and other Slavic peoples within the Austrian Empire under the scepter of the Habsburg Dynasty¹¹. The process of the emergence of supranational Austro-Slavism is a logical continuation of the growing political importance of the Austrian Slavs as a whole. In the 19th century the Danube Monarchy was on the verge of a large-scale modernisation, one of the main causes of which was the multi-ethnicity of the empire. A country, in which the fundamental political and economic power, as well as the great human potential was represented by the Slavs, could not help taking this fact into account in its internal politics. Suffice it to say that in the Austrian army, that numbered 647,000 people in peacetime, the Slavs accounted for more than a half, and the share of the Czechs and Slovaks reached only 126,700 people (as compared with the Germans, that numbered 168800 people, and the Hungarians, that numbered 42800 people)¹². It should be noted that Illyrianism, as an integration idea, also presumed first the federalisation of the Habsburg Empire and then the formation of the Illyrian Kingdom within its borders. It was supposed to annex the territories of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia. Illyrianism itself, as a supranational idea, was inherently close to Austro-Slavism. The main theoretical idea of the Illyrians was the idea of constructing the Great Illyria, which, in beliefs of the Croatian national figures, should unite all the South Slavic and some non-Slavic territories. The reason for existence of this supranational integration project was the belief of the elite in the existence of linguistic and cultural closeness of these peoples. At the same time, the idea of Illyrianism objectively met the purpose of rallying the Balkan Slavs around the Habsburg Empire. As we can see, Austro-Slavism, Illyrianism should also be considered as supranational integration forms, in the content of which there is an idea of federalisation of the Austrian Empire under condition of development of the Slavic nations.

The idea of a supranational Slavic Federation was also supported by members of the Cyril and Methodius Society. For the society members the ideal of the political state system of integration of the Slavic peoples was the democratic Slavic federation¹³. At the same time, the ideologues of the society saw a possible way of gaining real national freedom for Ukraine in creating a single Slavic Union, because they considered the choice of a separate way to

achieve independent political existence for Ukraine to be a difficult process. Members of the Cyril and Methodius Society offered their own version of Pan-Slavism. The policy requirements of the society included creation of a Pan-Slavic Federation of democratic republics, which would have a democratic government at equality of all citizens. At the same time, recognising the right of broad autonomy for every nation that would join the union of nations, the Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood assumed that the Russian language should become the main diplomatic language in the union¹⁴. It also envisaged abolishing serfdom and class privileges in the new Slavic Union. Thus, the Cyril and Methodius variant also represented a democratic, but at the same time, a supranational integration idea.

In the above context, we consider it necessary to determine the specific features of Pan-Slavism. The peculiarity of the formation and development of Pan-Slavism, as a kind of integrative supranational idea, was its origin from the idea of ethnic, linguistic, cultural and confessional affinity of the Slavic peoples. In our opinion, the idea of confessional proximity should not be regarded as one of the attributes that accompanied the evolution of the national ideology of the West Slavs. Regarding the existence and interaction of two great Christian trends (Orthodoxy and Catholicism) in the ethnic field of the West Slavs, it should be noted that the vast majority of West Slavic intellectuals did not equate the spirituality and history of their people with the spiritual-religious algorithm of Orthodoxy. Although sometimes Slavic national theorists made certain conceptual interpretations on the subject. In our opinion, their emergence was determined by their interpreters' outlook and religious position rather than by the peculiarity of time and place. For example, the Russian Slavician of the 19th century P. Kulakovsky offered his own interpretation of the works of the Slavic National Awakening representatives.

He argued that the ideals of Slavic unity were regarded by the awakeners not merely as a literary unity, but rather as a process of spiritual and religious integration, when the actual convergence of the Slavs would lead the peoples "to their full and, accordingly, religious unity". At the same time, P. Kulakovsky, basing on the ideas of the Slovak L.Štúr, tried to give the following interpretation of the heritage of the Slovak awakener, "Štúr as ... a sincere, deep Slavic figure ... directly acknowledged only one correct way out of Slavic dissociation — to unite everyone in religion and to return to Orthodoxy with all the consequences that would follow"¹⁵. It is clear that such an interpretation of L. Štúr's ideas had its right to exist. But in our opinion, the confessional factor undoubtedly had a significant influence on the emergence of Pan-Slavic ideas among the South Slavs — Serbs, Montenegrins, Bulgarians, Macedonians and, of course, the part of Galician Ukrainians who professed Orthodoxy. As a matter of fact, regarding the latter, the available archival material allows us to

argue that the tsarist government tried to give spiritual support to the Orthodox Slavs. Major General Muravyov's memorandum is well known. He sent a note to the Holy Synod not only describing the provisions of the Orthodox Slavs of the Austrian Empire, but also making suggestions as to the possible forms and extent of assistance. The note reached Emperor Nicholas I. We can find out about this fact from the remarks written on this note by Chief Procurator of the Synod N. Protasov. He wrote, "It was reported to His Imperial Majesty in Tsarskoe Selo on November 1st, 1838. The Emperor is most inclined to approve the proposed measures and ordered to discuss with Count Nesselrode the opportunity to send spiritual books to the Orthodox of Austria through the Embassy"¹⁶. As we can see, the Russian government supported Orthodoxy.

At the same time, it would be too categorical and biased to claim that Catholicism, and especially Protestantism, were in a state of severe crisis in the environment of the West Slavs, and this, in turn, was one of the reasons for criticising them by the West Slavs national ideologues in favour of Orthodoxy. As we have already noted, in the process of constructing national content of linguistic emancipation, the ideologues-awakeners relied on both national-patriotic ideology and technology of antagonism. As a matter of fact, technology of antagonism was not less convenient for politicising the problem of coexistence of Slavic and German cultures, Catholicism and Orthodoxy. In one way or another V.F. Timkovsky, M.P. Pogodin, Y. Kollar, V. Hanka, A.F. Gilferding, M.I. Kostomarov, V. Boguslavsky, F. Engels, L. Štúr touched upon, investigated this topic and sometimes harped on the "flywheel of mutual confrontation" in the 19th century. Accordingly, to substantiate their vision of the content of the revival process, certain theorists chose such facts from history and religion, which could highlight the negative effects of the West Slavs Catholicisation.

Herewith, such an ideological approach in the content of national struggle should be considered atypical for the awakeners of the Slavic background. Slavic or Russian Pan-Slavic theorists, rather than the West Slavic awakeners, were likely to choose antagonism as to the contradictions between Catholicism and Orthodoxy as an argument in the content of an integrative supranational idea.

Considering the process of forming a national paradigm of the West Slavs in the context of the Pan-Slavic idea, it should be noted that in the background of the ethnic past the "aspiration to the community" was a natural spiritual phenomenon (and actually this was the essence of the idea), so the development of the Czech, Slovak, Lusatian literary languages during the 19th century was inherently accompanied by a philosophy of unity that mastered the thoughts of many creative personalities in the territory of the German-Slavic space at the time of the formation of the nations. At the same time, according

to the modern Slavic studies, the statement about the scale of introducing the West Slavic society to the content of the ideology of Pan-Slavism was a certain exaggeration. This clearly indicates the fact that there was a desire to distinguish between Pan-Slavism and Russophilism among the Slavic national ideologues.

A first-hand assessment of the national concepts of the West Slavic intellectuals should be given taking into account the ideology, international and political situations in which the facts were interpreted. It is known that the leaders of the western national movement of the period of formation of the civil society, and even a Slovak L. Štúr, publicly distanced from tsarophilic Pan-Slavism more than once. At the same time, for them cultural Pan-Slavism quite often became a reference point concept in the process of self-identification and on the way of constructing a national ideologue¹⁷.

In the context of the study, the use of this type of political Pan-Slavism, such as Slavophile or Russian Pan-Slavism, is of a particular interest. Its adherents suggested that the Slavic peoples could be united around Russia. As you know, a similar version of interpretation of Pan-Slavism was considered to some extent by L. Štúr. It is worth commenting on the position of the Slovak awakener with some lines from his letter to an unidentified person. Despite his image of a national Slavic patriot, in his letter L. Štúr criticised Polish politicians who put into practice the idea of resisting Russian imperial expansion in their national programme. “Your path”, wrote the Slovak national ideologist, “is not borrowed from the Slavic idea, because you are uniting with anyone ... but you are also uniting with our enemies against your brothers”¹⁸.

The final layout of Štúr’s Pan-Slavism was given in the treatise “The Slavs and the World of the Future. Message to the Slavs from the Danube Banks”. Given that the treatise appeared chronologically in 1851, immediately after the end of the revolution of 1848–1849, we consider it expedient to include Štúr’s work in our study. It should be added that the reasons that motivated L. Štúr to write the treatise have remained unclear. At the same time, it should be recalled that in the course of three years, before his work “The Slavs and the World of the Future” emerged, the Slovak awakener, being a delegate to the Prague Congress, had not expressed Russophile thoughts and had not proclaimed the slogan about the need to unite all Slavic peoples under scepter of the Russian Empire.

Accordingly, the general features of the Slovak awakener’s supranational concept were reduced to the idea that there was a tendency according to which the status of Russia, as the largest Slavic state, suggested the possibility of forming a renewed Slavic monarchy on a federal basis. In his treatise L. Štúr set out a gradual programme of achieving supranational Slavic integration. First, formation of a federation of Slavic states was presupposed. At the same

time, within the Austrian Empire, western and southern Slavs should have gradually become the driving force behind quality national change within the empire itself. The final stage of a large-scale supranational integration process would have been the annexation of the Slavs to Russia¹⁹.

Note, however, that L. Štúr himself considered the project of forming a Slavic federal and republican state to be an unreal dream, because the practical side of the project “from the very beginning”, wrote the Slovak national ideologist, “required to cross out the Tsarist Russia and those tribes that either have already been part of it, or have recognized the fact of its patronage according to the International Law”²⁰. According to this scenario, in practice, only the Slavic subjects of the Habsburg Crown could be included in the new Slavic federation, that ultimately “diluted” the very Štúr’s idea of supranational all-Slavic integration. Accordingly, L. Štúr expressed his opinion, that on its way of achieving the status of the Slavic world’s leader, Russia was tasked to carry out foreign and domestic political transformations. L.Štúr further developed his idea that, above all things, the Eastern Empire had to destroy serfdom, the “ominous secret police” and had to abandon forever such foreign political alliances that “were only supporting those, who were already falling, as well as helpless dynasties and thrones”²¹. Such radical socio-political reforms, in the Slovak awakener’s opinion, would not have only supported the ethno-national identity of each Slavic tribe, but also would have been a prerequisite for the expansion of inter-Slavic integration.

There is no doubt that the radicalisation of social sentiment, the beginning of the process of politicisation of the Pan-Slavism ideology influenced J.P. Jordan, a representative of the ethnic movement of the Lusatian Serbs, and he rethought its content. The Spring of Nations period marked the moment of Jordan’s final transition to a position of criticising Pan-Slavism. He definitely connected the idea of the Lusatian Serb Awakening with the supranational integration idea of Austro-Slavism. Jordan’s brochure, small in volume, which was issued under quite a big name “Neither German! Nor Russian! Only Austrian”, can be supportive to the above mentioned statement. In his brochure Jordan specified his attitude to the prospect of the Slavic problem in the background of Pan-Slavism. Actually, the Lusatian intellectual, appealing to Slavic national ideologues and politicians, urged them not to “play with Pan-Slavism” and to support the Austrian authorities if they were not willing to see “pretty sophisticated Cossack dances” in their territories that were already happening in Hungary in those days²². “Therefore”, concluded Jordan, “Austria must be German and it will remain German in the future”²³.

In fact, there emerged a new national core, which began creating its own evolutionary political agenda under the pressure of active German and Hungarian national aspirations. At the same time, it is worth acknowledging

that the Slavs of Western Austria, in the 30's — 40's of the XIX century defined rather a modest purpose of their movement: recognition of their language, history and national identity.

It can be argued that in certain parts of society these components stimulated the emergence of national ideology, and in the flow of time, its propaganda too. At the same time, as we have noted above, a certain ideological attribute on the path of the Slavic peoples' evolution to a mature nation was a pan-idea, one of the symbols of which was Slavic Russia. At the same time, the peculiarity of Russian Pan-Slavism was in that it was developing within the same framework as the formation of the Russian national idea in the Eastern Empire. Accordingly, Russia tried to maintain its Pan-Slavic status in the European geopolitical field, which undoubtedly became a discussion material not only for the Pan-Germanists, Austrophiles, but also for the liberal and conservative ideologues of supranational Austro-Slavism.

At the same time, Pan-Slavism of the first half of the 19th century with its integrative and supranational principles, and, most importantly, the national liberation movement represented still unexplored and unclear phenomenon from the perspective of its development in the understanding of the representatives of the Russian political elite. Therefore, guided by the principle of "better forbid than mend", the Russian government's representatives initiated the publication of a series of circulars, they also ordered to hold events aimed at preventing and counteracting the penetration into Russia of "hostile liberal" ideologies, which was actively reached by them in the background of the ideas of Pan-Slavism. Thus, the reasons for the personal concern of a Minister S.S. Uvarov regarding the liberalisation of national ideologies can be found in his "Report to the Emperor" of May 5th, 1847²⁴, and in the "Secret Circular Proposal" of May 27th, 1847²⁵.

In the imperial circular the Minister of Education S.S. Uvarov quite pragmatically defined the goal of the Russian autocracy's foreign policy, "We are obliged to agree on the beginning of the Russian mind, the Russian virtue, the Russian feeling. "Further, the minister, in the pure spirit of "security ideology", was quite critical about the realisation of the idea of Slavic unity: "Everything, we have in Russia, belongs to us only, without any participation of other Slavic peoples"²⁶.

The available historical material allows us to assert that in his attempt to counter the break-in of liberalism into the territory of the empire, the Russian Tsar was even ready to use weapons against the Slavs. Thus, being afraid of the possible emergence of Polish revolutionary groups on the western Russian border, the Emperor gives his order to General Paskevich in his letter, "If there are breakthroughs from abroad, they should be repulsed, and the captured superiors with weapons should be judged by the field criminal provisions and executed immediately, but in no way pursued abroad"²⁷.

It is quite clear, that in the context of both foreign and domestic policy of the Russian Empire in terms of the European Revolution of 1848–1849, the Slavic Pan-Idea became a minor problem in the context of the tsarist policy. Prevention of the territory of the empire from penetration of liberal ideas became the priority task for the political elite. The official position of Russia on the problem of the development of Slavic national ideas at the initial stage of the revolution of 1848 can be commented by quoting the lines from the Minister of Public Education Uvarov's report to the Emperor of the Russian Empire Nicholas I. Uvarov reported to the Emperor: "A problem has opened up that, at first glance, seems quite safe. Foreign Slavic writers have chosen the Slavic idea as a slogan for dangerous liberal dreams. Meanwhile, ill intentions are sometimes concealed behind literary images and Slavic legends"²⁸. No matter how, but the paradigm of the Russian government's attitude to supranational integration depended directly on the Emperor Nicholas Pavlovich's position. Accordingly, its content can be most probably defined as a foreign policy practice of persistently monitoring the Slavic opinion and maximally counteracting the possibility of any liberal ideas penetrating the territory of the empire. Therefore, within the framework of the above-mentioned thesis, in the margins of the protocol of an investigation file, which was given to him after the arrest and interrogation of the famous Slavophile I.S. Aksakov in the third branch office of his Majesty's Office, Nicholas I personally wrote, "Under the guise of sympathy for the Slavic tribes the criminal thought of rebellion against the legitimate authorities is sometimes concealed, such thoughts are detrimental to Russia!"²⁹. Thus, the emperor and his ministers were frankly concerned about the radicalisation of Slavic national movements. The official position of Russia was based on an uncompromising attitude towards western liberalism, even though there was a tendency to expand the experience of the cultural Slavic community.

In this connection, the documents, which today are mainly concentrated in the archival institutions of Ukraine, are worth mentioning. Thus, in the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Kyiv, the material, that covers the policy of the empire concerning Slavs, is stored. The collections and declarations of congresses and meetings of foreign Slavs in 1848, which were also sent to the Russian Empire, are of utmost importance. But the two documents are the most interesting ones and they are related to V.Hanka's information about the Slavic Congress of 1848 in Prague sent to Kiev. On May 1st, 1848, V. Hanka addressed A.Y. Storozhenko with the statement "Slavs, brethren!" ...and he added single-handedly on the back of the page, "Dear Sir! We would all be fine, but damn Germans! I regret you do not have the opportunity to find out what kind of lawless tricks they wish to use to get us into their godlessness ... Read the ruling of Frankfurt ... impostors ... We do not want unity with this

great Germany. We are Slavs and we will remain Slavs to the last drop of blood. It was great to see our Russian brothers at our convention”³⁰. Through the Russian Governor in Poland the information about V. Hanka’s letter was brought to the very attention of the Russian Tsar. A peculiar decision of the emperor was outlined in the Governor’s reply to A.Y. Storozhenko very soon as for the nineteenth century, already on May 15th (27th), 1848. The original of this letter with the following content was preserved in the funds of the Institute of Manuscripts of the National Library of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine: “To Mr. Senator, Privy Councillor Storozhenko. The Emperor, as a result of my most humble note on the subject of receiving a letter from Václav Hanka by Your Majesty, highly orders to leave this letter unanswered. What I consider to inform Your Majesty for the mandatory execution. Signature. Governor Field Marshal”³¹. Thus, the tsarist regime rather negatively treated the participation of Russians in the Slavic Congress and in the supranational Slavic movement initiated by foreign leaders of the Slavic revival, moreover, when the Slavic movement joined the revolution of 1848–1849. On the contrary, as further events testified, Russia acted as a gendarme in suppressing the national liberation struggle of the peoples of the Austrian Empire.

For our part, it is fair to admit that the formation and evolution of Pan-Slavic ideology in Russia were closely monitored by the tsarist government, and its content correlated with the foreign policy of St. Petersburg. It is no coincidence that only a few years after the European Revolution of 1848–1849, a well-known representative of Russian official science and foreign policy theorist M. Pogodin, emphasizing the new content of Pan-Slavism, would quite clearly and openly state, “The time of reckless passion for the west has passed ... so we must appear on the European stage, we must show our faces there”³². It was during this period of history that the search for an answer to the political format of Russia’s relations with the West Slavs was in the plane of two conflicting concepts — Westernism and Slavophilism. The latter, in fact, formed the basis of Russian Pan-Slavic ideology, in which the idea of Slavic cultural and political unity occupied a subordinate place in the context of Orthodoxy.

Gradually, supporters of a supranational Slavic idea began to regard the idea as a particular instrument of Russian imperial foreign policy: “Our allies in Europe are Slavs”, argued ideologues, “They are native to us. Give them a holy purpose of their liberation from the unbearable yoke under which they have been groaning for four hundred years, be able to control their forces ... and you will see what miracles they can do”³³. Accordingly, it is worth acknowledging that the efforts of individual Russian politicians, as well as a number of Slavic awakeners brought about the factors of evolution of Slavic national paradigms that became supranational ideas.

Pro-Russian Pan-Slavism, as an ideology, further developed its conceptual development within Slavophilism, which was certainly the reason for its long term criticism from the next generation of politicians, publicists and scholars. For example, a well-known American nationalist scholar, Hans Kohn, came to the conclusion that “Pan-Slavism ... was a movement to extend the power of Russia by means of inclusion of other Slavic-speaking peoples, even against their will, in “Greater Russia, population and economic resources of which would create sufficient base for world domination of Russia”³⁴. Gradually, in historical practice, with the development of the very idea of Pan-Slavism, it became more and more heterogeneous in its content, and the term “Pan-Slavism” became more vague and ambiguous. Accordingly, despite the genesis of Pan-Slavism as a supranational idea, it did not acquire the significance of all-Slavic integration ideology, did not take on the form of pan-Slavic consciousness, but represented only a set of diverse Pan-Slavic theories and views of its adherents.

To sum up, we should note that Pan-Slavism and the attempt to reproduce the idea of universal Slavic consciousness in its background were never exceptionally progressive factors. Against the will of its founders, Pan-Slavism was doomed to conflict with ethnic self-consciousness, with the interests of each individual Slavic nation and the process of self-determination. So at certain stages of the development of the Western Slavic peoples, the common Slavic consciousness not only contributed to the development of national consciousness, but also prevented the consolidation of the national principle by being more archaic, mythologised, and based on more conservative ethnic stereotypes.

In the process of Slavic nation-building, a new intellectual core emerged, which began to create its own evolutionary political agenda under pressure of active German and Hungarian national aspirations. At the same time, it is worth acknowledging that in the 19th century the Slavs of Central Europe defined quite a modest purpose of their movement — recognition of their language, history and national identity. It can be argued that the enumerated components stimulated the emergence of national ideology in certain parts of society, and subsequently its propaganda. At the same time, as we have noted above, pan-idea, one of the symbols of which was Slavic Russia, was a certain ideological attribute on the path of the Slavic peoples’ evolution to a mature nation. At the same time, the peculiarity of Russian Pan-Slavism was in that it developed in the Eastern Empire following the Russian national idea’s formation. Accordingly, Russia tried to maintain its Pan-Slavic status in the European geopolitical field, which undoubtedly became a discussion material not only for the Pan-Germanists and Austrophiles, but also for the liberal and conservative ideologues of supranational Austro-Slavism.

In our opinion, regarding the presence of the idea of Russophilism and tsarophilism in the context of the national ideologies of the West Slavs and their critics, the following is worth noting: actualization of the ideas themselves in the first half of the 19th century and their further political interpretation were often a result of introduction of the far-fetched theoretical and ideological projects. They should be considered as an immanent part of the content of the national Slavic movements ideology, as well as ideas that came to the Slavic peoples and were stimulated from the outside.

In the light of the above — mentioned, it is logical to assume that the West Slavic intellectuals were certainly aware of the contradiction, validity and place of the Slav-Russian component in the context of their national and cultural aspirations' project. At the same time, however, they did not deny the “intermediary” services of the Russian “image” and the supranational Pan-Slavic idea that they sometimes implicitly used as a “leverage” on their government. Such actions, manifestations of interrelationships were usually accompanied by a rather emotional background and often led to the appearance of subjective and biased judgments. However, in our opinion, a political position, lacking objectivity in the assessment of Pan-Slavism, can also be understood. At the stage of nation-building and in the period of high international competition, the noble goal of protecting one's ethnicity, preserving and developing one's culture and language justified the means of achieving them.

¹ Колейка Й. Славянские программы и идея славянской солидарности в XIX и XX веках. Praha: Statni ped. Nakl-vi, 1964. 264 с.; Šťastný Vladislav. Slovanství v národním životě Čechů a Slováků. V Praze: Pro Ústav dějin evropských socialistických zemí ČSAV vydalo nakl. Melantrich, 1968. 500 s.

² Wollman F. Kollárův mesianismus. *Slovanská vzájemnost. 1836–1936*. Praha, 1938. S. 34–59; Žáček V. Ohlas polského povstání r. 1863 v Čechách. Praha, 1935. 233 s.

³ Всероссийская этнографическая выставка и Славянский Съезд в май 1867 года. Москва, [Др.:] Унив. Типогр., 1867. С. 100.

⁴ Thun-Hohenstein (Graf von). Über den gegenwärtigen Stand der böhmischen Literatur und ihre Bedeutung. Prag.Kronberger und Řivnač, 1842. S. 70–72. [Electronic resource]. URL: <https://books.google.ru/books>.

⁵ Leo Graf von Thun-Hohenstein (Graf von). Die Stellung der Slowaken in Ungarn. Praga, 1843. S. 25.

⁶ Bilý F. Korespondence a zápisky F.L. Čelakovského. Praha, 1908. B.1. S. 121. URL: <https://books.google.ru/books>.

⁷ Письмо И.С. Гагарина — И.С. Аксакову. Париж. 14/26.11.1874. URL: <http://litnasledstvo.ru/site>.

⁸ Селищев А. Взгляды Карела Гавличка на Россию. Казань 1913. С. 12–13.

⁹ Masaryk T.G. Česká otázka: snahy a tužby národního obrození. Praha: Svoboda, 1990. S. 26.

¹⁰ Антясов М.В. Панамериканизм: идеология и политика. Москва, 1981. С. 173.

¹¹ Moritsch A. Der Austroslavismus — ein verfrühtes Konzept zur politischen Neugestaltung Mitteleuropas. *Der Austroslavismus: ein verfrühtes Konzept zur politischen Neugestaltung Mitteleuropas*. Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 1996. S. 11.

¹² Гильфердинг А.Ф. Славянские народы в Австрии и Турции. *Статьи по современным вопросам славянским*. Санкт-Петербург, 1868. Т. 2. С. 112–113.

¹³ Статут Кирило-Мефодіївського товариства 1845 — кінець 1846 р. *Кирило-Мефодіївське товариство: У 3-х томах*. Київ.: Наук. думка, 1990. Т. I. С. 150–152.

¹⁴ Семевский В.И. Н.И. Гулак. *Галерея шлисельбургских узников*. Санкт-Петербург, 1907. Ч. I. С. 39.

¹⁵ Кулаковский П.А. Иллиризм: Исследования по истории хорватской литературы периода Возрождения. Варшава, 1894. С. 232.

¹⁶ О положении православия и унии в австрийских владениях. Секретно. *РГИА*. Санкт-Петербург. Ф. 797. Оп. 8. Ед. хр. 24170.

¹⁷ Загора Р. Идеолог словацкого национального возрождения Людовит Штур и представители российских общественных и научных кругов в 1830-х первой половине 1850-х гг. Санкт-Петербург, 2011. С. 122.

¹⁸ Listy L'udovíta Ntúra. Vyd. J. Ambrus. II. S. 19.

¹⁹ Штур Л. Славянство и мир будущего. Послание славянам с берегов Дуная. Москва.: В унив. тип. (Катков и Ко), 1867. С. 133.

²⁰ Там само. С. 119.

²¹ Там само. С. 163–164.

²² Jordan J.P. Nicht deutsch! Nicht rußisch! Nur österreichisch!: offenes Sendschreiben an Herrn Franz Schuselka. Prag, 1849. S.31. URL: <https://books.google.ru/books>.

²³ Jordan J.P. Nicht deutsch! Nicht rußisch! S. 21–22.

²⁴ Уваров С.С. Доклад Императору о славянстве, от 5 мая 1847 г. *Наше минуле. Журнал исторії, літератури і культури*. 1918. № 2. С. 171–177.

²⁵ Уваров С.С. Циркулярное предложение Попечителю Московского учебного округа, от 27 мая 1847. *Русский архив. Историко-литературный сборник*. 1892. № 7. С. 347–351.

²⁶ Уваров С.С. Циркуляр министерства народного просвещения от 30 мая 1847 года. *Русский архив*. 1892. Кн. 7. С. 336.

²⁷ Николай I — Паскевичу. Письмо. 28.03.1848. *Щербатов А.П. Генерал-Фельдмаршал князь Паскевич. Его жизнь и деятельность. Составил кн. Щербатов*. Санкт-Петербург: Тип. Голике, 1899. Т. 6. С. 205–208.

²⁸ Рождественский С.В. Исторический обзор деятельности Министерства народного просвещения, 1802–1902. Санкт-Петербург: М-во нар. просвещения, 1902. С. 74.

²⁹ Аксаков И.С. Вопросы, предложенные Ивану Сергеевичу Аксакову III-м отделением. *Быть России в благоденствии и славе: Послания великим князьям, царям, императорам, политическим деятелям о том, как улучшить «государственное устройство»*. Москва, 2002. С. 348.

³⁰ Воззвание «Słowianie, Wcacia!» присланное В. Ганкой А. Стороженко, напечатано на польском, чешском языках с припиской Ганки к Стороженко на одном из листов. 1 мая 1848 Прага. *IP НБУВ*. Ф. 8. Коллекция университета св. Владимира. Од. 255–2554. 4 арк.

³¹ Секретное предписание наместника в царстве Польском генерал-фельдмаршала Варшавскому сенатору и тайному советнику Стороженко А.Я. об оставлении без ответа письма В. Ганки. Оригинал 15/27 мая 1848 года. *IP НБУВ*. Ф. VIII, шифр 2561. Арк. 2.

³² РГАЛИ. Ф. № 373 (Погодин М.П.). Оп. 1. Д. 4. Л. 1.

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³⁴ Кон Г. Национализм: его смысл и история. *Проблемы Восточной Европы*. Вашингтон, 1994, № 41–42. С. 89–91. URL: <http://www.traditio.ru.htm>.

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